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A B S T R A C T
The “transition happiness gap” has been one of the most robust ﬁndings in the literature on life satisfaction. Until very recently, scholars using various
datasets have shown that residents of post-communist countries were signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with their lives than their counterparts in non-transition
countries (controlling for income and other socio-economic characteristics). The literature has explained this ﬁnding by the great macroeconomic in-
stability of the 1990s, by a substantial decrease in the quality and accessibility of public goods, by the major increase in inequality, and by the rapid
depreciation of pre-transition human capital. All these factors were expected to subside over time – at least after the post-Great-Recession recovery. In this
paper, we consider two most recent datasets – the third wave of the Life in Transition Survey (administered in 2015–16) and the 2010–2016 waves of the
annual Gallup World Poll. We ﬁnd that by 2016 the transition happiness gap had closed. This convergence has taken place both due to a “happiness
recovery” in post-communist countries after the Great Recession and due to a decrease in life satisfaction in comparator countries in recent years. We also
ﬁnd that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by middle-income young, educated individuals, regardless of gender.
1. Introduction
The transition from planned to market economy has been a unique political, social and economic transformation undertaken in a
relatively short period of time. In the last twenty-ﬁve years, the citizens of former communist countries have lived through a complete
overhaul of public and social institutions, the emergence of a new private sector, and the re-integration into the global economy.
While there has been a signiﬁcant divergence of transition trajectories (in particular, between Central and Eastern Europe, on the
one hand, and the Former Soviet Union, on the other), academic research has identiﬁed one important common property shared by
all post-communist countries: the so-called “transition happiness gap”. Residents of former communist countries have been reporting
signiﬁcantly lower life satisfaction than their counterparts in countries with similar income levels that did not undergo the transition
from plan to market. Following the decline in incomes in the ﬁrst years of transition and subsequent economic growth, life sa-
tisfaction also partially recovered after its initial fall (see Easterlin, 2014 and Inglehart et al., 2013). However, until very recently, this
recovery did not bring life satisfaction in transition countries up to the levels of countries with similar per capita income.1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2018.07.003
Accepted 2 July 2018
☆ The authors are grateful to the Editors of this issue, to the participants of the “People Matter: Quality of Life and Population Wellbeing in Post-
Transition Economies” conference at the Kyiv School of Economics and in particular to our discussant Vladimir Paniotto, as well as Alicia Adsera,
Francesca Dalla Pozza, Lukas Kleine-Ruechkamp, and Elena Nikolova for helpful comments and suggestions. Views presented are those of the
authors and not necessarily of the EBRD.
⁎ Corresponding author at: Sciences Po, Paris, France.
E-mail address: sergei.guriev@sciencespo.fr (S. Guriev).
1 This ﬁnding has been documented in studies using all major international sources of life satisfaction data. Sanfey and Teksoz (2007); Guriev and
Zhuravskaya (2009); Easterlin (2009) identify the transition happiness gap in the World Values Survey (the ﬁrst ﬁve waves, up to 2008); Deaton
(2008) – in the Gallup World Poll (the ﬁrst wave, 2006), Djankov et al. (2016) – in the Life in Transition Survey (the ﬁrst and the second rounds,
2006 and 2010, respectively), Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Eurobarometer, and the European Values Survey.
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Why did residents of transition countries report lower life satisfaction? Economists have been able to identify several common
factors contributing to the transition happiness gap. East Europeans’ lower life satisfaction may be explained by their dissatisfaction
with their governments (Djankov et al., 2016) and their legal systems (Nikolova, 2016). The happiness gap has also been related to
the traumatic experience of the macroeconomic instability of early transition, to the deterioration of public goods, and the increase in
income inequality during the transition (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). It may have also been driven by the impact of the de-
preciation of the human capital stock accumulated under central planning: skills acquired before the transition turned out to be less
useful in the market economy (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009).
This analysis has predicted that the transition happiness gap should eventually disappear.2 As the quality of public services
improves and younger and newly educated cohorts enter the labor market, post-communist countries should be converging to their
non-transition peers in terms of life satisfaction. This convergence has been delayed (or slowed down) by the Great Recession that has
had a disproportionally strong impact on the post-communist countries. However, the post-crisis recovery and the introduction of the
more resilient macroeconomic framework (macroprudential regulation and inﬂation targeting) should contribute to eliminating the
transition happiness gap and prevent further large macroeconomic shocks in the future.
In this paper, we re-evaluate the impact of transition on life satisfaction using the newly available data from the third round of the
Life in Transition Survey (LiTS III) and the 2010–2016 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll. We ﬁnd that the happiness gap has
closed: the residents of post-communist countries are no longer less satisﬁed with life than their peers, living in countries that have
similar levels of income but did not undergo the transition from plan to market. We also ﬁnd that this result is primarily driven by the
convergence in life satisfaction among the younger cohorts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results
and provides robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Data
In this paper, we use data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) and from the Gallup World Poll (GWP).
The Life in Transition Survey has been conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by the World
Bank in 2006 (ﬁrst wave), 2010 (second wave) and in the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 (third wave). We mostly use the
third wave (LiTS III) which was administered in 29 former communist countries (excluding Turkmenistan) and ﬁve comparator
countries (Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus). Over 2500 localities were visited, and over 51,000 interviews were com-
pleted with randomly selected households. The survey was representative at the country level.
The survey includes questions on economic well-being, beliefs, attitudes, and life satisfaction. The latter is our main variable of
interest. The respondents were asked whether they agree with the statement “All things considered, I am satisﬁed with my life now”.
They could choose among ﬁve options: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “agree” and “strongly agree”,
thus, creating a ﬁve-point scale for the degree of life satisfaction. We also created a binary measure of life satisfaction, assuming the
respondents to be satisﬁed with their life if they chose “agree”, and “strongly agree” and dissatisﬁed with their life otherwise.
We also use the data from 2010 to 2016 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll. We exclude the years prior to 2010 because all the
variables of interest are available only for a limited number of countries.3 The data covers 31 post-communist countries and terri-
tories (including Nagorno-Karabakh) and 133 comparator countries with approximately 450,000 observations for which we have all
the variables of interest. For each country-year Gallup typically surveys 1000 randomly selected individuals, constituting a nationally
representative sample.4
Similarly to LiTS, the Gallup World Poll includes multiple questions on attitudes, beliefs, objective and perceived socio-economic
well-being. Our main question of interest is formulated in the following way: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the
bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible
life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”.
2.2. Methodology
Our analysis of the transition happiness gap is based on the conventional econometric model of life satisfaction:
= + ′ +life satisfaction β post−communist country X γ· { } ɛ ,ic c ic ic (1)
where the measure of life satisfaction for individual i in country c is regressed on an indicator that takes the value of one if c is a
2 Nikolova (2016) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in life satisfaction between transition and non-transition countries already in the sixth wave of
the World Values Survey (2010–13). However, this result may be driven by the small number of observations as this wave only includes 13
transition countries.
3 Only 17 post-communist countries have all the data for 2009; this number increases to 25 for 2010.
4 However, the residents of certain countries are not surveyed on an annual basis. For this reason, in some speciﬁcation we only consider a panel
of countries, for which GWP has data for all years; this panel includes 23 post-communist countries and 40 non-transition countries. The full list of
countries for which all the data is available in a given year is presented in the appendix.
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former communist country and on a vector of individual characteristics that capture the conventional determinants of life satisfaction
(Clark et al., 2017) that can be proxied by variables available in LiTS and GWP. These include age and age squared (or, alternatively,
birth-year dummies), as well as income, education, gender, marital status, the number of children in the household, urban rather than
rural residence, and employment status. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
The coeﬃcient β represents the eﬀect of living in a former communist country on life satisfaction (controlling for conventional
individual- and household-level determinants of happiness). If β is negative and signiﬁcant, this means that the “transition happiness
gap” is still present; if there is no signiﬁcant negative eﬀect, then the gap has closed.
We also consider the following modiﬁcations of the model:
   

  
∑= ∈ + ′ +life satisfaction φ post−communist country birth year γ· { } · { } ɛ ,ic c
(2)
   

  
∑= ∈ + ′ +life satisfaction ψ post−communist country education γ· { } · { } ɛ ,ic c
(3)
   

  ∑= ∈ + ′ +life satisfaction μ post−communist country gender γ· { } · { } ɛ ,ic c
(4)
   

  ∑= ∈ + ′ +life satisfaction θ post−communist country income γ· { } · { } ɛ ,ic c
(5)
where  represents various groups of birth years (or age),  – income groups,  – gender, and  denotes the highest level of
education, completed by the respondent. This setting allows us to study, whether or not the closing of the transition happiness gap
was uniform across age, education, and income categories.
3. Results
3.1. Main results: the closing of the transition happiness gap
3.1.1. Results from the Life in Transition Survey
The LiTS III data show that there is no longer a gap between post-communist countries and comparator countries in terms of life
satisfaction. Fig. 1 reports the regional averages of life satisfaction levels by country groups (for the binary measure of life sa-
tisfaction). The Central Asian countries report very high levels of life satisfaction. Central Europe and Baltics (CEB) are roughly at par
with Germany and Italy. South-Eastern Europe (SEE), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (EEC) and Russia have life satisfaction levels
similar to those of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.5
The average level of life satisfaction in post-communist countries is 50% – well below that of Germany and Italy (61%). However,
this diﬀerence is fully explained by the fact that transition countries have a lower income per capita. Fig. 2 presents the share of
residents satisﬁed with their life and countries’ per capita GDP in 2015. Except for three outliers (the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan), there is a strong positive correlation between the level of development and life satisfaction. Even without the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – that report unusually high levels of life satisfaction given their per capita incomes – life
satisfaction in post-communist countries is not lower than in other countries with similar income levels. In 2015–16, controlling for
per capita income, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between post-communist and comparator countries. This result is not driven by
any single country including Greece (where life satisfaction is substantially below the trend) or Germany (where life satisfaction is a
little above the trend).
Fig. 2 shows that the “happiness convergence” has taken place both due to the substantial increase in life satisfaction in most
former communist countries and due to the decrease in life satisfaction in comparator countries between 2010 and 2016. In Germany
and Turkey, life satisfaction has declined despite income growth. In Italy, life satisfaction declined alongside the fall in GDP per
capita, but the decrease in life satisfaction was more pronounced than the fall in GDP would predict. Greece and Cyprus were not
covered by LiTS in 2010, but their current life satisfaction levels are lower than those implied by their per capita incomes. In 2010 the
picture was completely diﬀerent: relative to transition countries, life satisfaction in all Western countries was signiﬁcantly higher
than their income would suggest (except for Italy where it was on the trend line).
Taken together, these results can be interpreted in the following way. In 2010, the transition happiness gap was still present. It
may well be the case that it could have disappeared already by 2010 as was predicted by the literature but the disproportionally high
impact of the Great Recession on the former communist countries resulted in a pronounced negative eﬀect on life satisfaction (EBRD,
2016, ch. 1). Since 2010, life satisfaction in these countries has strongly recovered, while comparator countries have suﬀered from a
prolonged stagnation, converging down to their post-communist counterparts.
The absence of the transition happiness gap is conﬁrmed by econometric tests. These tests (reported in Table 1) are based on a
5 In EBRD classiﬁcation, Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Central Europe and the Baltics
includes Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; South-Eastern Europe includes Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia; Eastern Europe and the Caucasus includes Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine.
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conventional model of life satisfaction (1). Columns (1.2) and (1.4) report the results for regressions that include self-reported
household income per capita (logarithm), while columns (1.3) and (1.5) report the same results for two proxies for income: answers
to questions whether the household can aﬀord holidays and meat, chicken or ﬁsh and whether the household can aﬀord unexpected
expenses.
Table 1 reports the results for the binary measure of life satisfaction (whether the respondent is satisﬁed with life or not); the
results for a ﬁve-point measure of life satisfaction are very similar (we report them in Section 3.3).
The eﬀects of the variables in Table 1 are intuitive and consistent with the literature on life satisfaction. Each additional level of
education (i.e., moving from no education to primary education, from primary to secondary, and from secondary to tertiary) in-
creases the probability of being satisﬁed with life by 5–10 percentage points. Being unemployed decreases life satisfaction by 12–19
percentage points. A 10% increase in income increases the probability of being satisﬁed with life by 1 percentage point. Women are
2–3 percentage points happier than men. Married individuals are 2 percentage points more likely to be satisﬁed with life than single
ones, while divorced or separated people are 4–7 percentage points less likely to be happy. Each additional child increases the
probability of happiness by 2–3 percentage points.6 The eﬀect of age is non-linear – for those under 50 life satisfaction decreases with
age, while for those older than 50 years it starts to increase with age. Table 1 presents the results with linear and squared terms for
age; the results with birth year dummies are very similar.7
The main variable of interest in Table 1 is residence in a post-communist country. The coeﬃcient for this variable is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. Thus, life satisfaction in post-communist countries is the same as in the sample of
comparator countries (controlling for other determinants of life satisfaction).
Columns (1.1)–(1.3) compare post-communist countries with Western Europe (Germany and Italy). Column (1.1) reports the
results without controlling for respondents’ income. In this speciﬁcation, life satisfaction in Germany and Italy is 5 percentage points
higher, but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Once income is controlled for, there is no diﬀerence in life satisfaction between
Western and post-communist countries (columns (1.2) and (1.3)).
Columns (1.4) and (1.5) compare post-communist countries with all the ﬁve comparator countries in the sample (Germany, Italy,
Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus). On average, life satisfaction in post-communist countries is higher than in these ﬁve countries
Fig. 1. Life satisfaction by region, LiTS. Source: LiTS III and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree with the statement “All things considered, I am satisﬁed with my
life now.” In all cases, the ﬁrst of the two bars indicates simple regional averages. The second represents the level of life satisfaction adjusted for
individual and household characteristics (see Table 1 below). The average for SEE does not include Cyprus and Greece, which are shown separately
with Turkey in the last two bars.
6 If we replace the household income per capita with total household income, the coeﬃcient for the number of children becomes negative; these
results are available on request.
7 We do not report the coeﬃcients on religion. They are in line with the ﬁndings of Djankov and Nikolova (2018) who in particular ﬁnd a negative
relationship between Eastern Orthodox religion and life satisfaction – as well as we do in both LiTS and GWP data.
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(especially controlling for income); however, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. All speciﬁcations above include the Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; a model excluding these countries produces similar results.
Table 2 demonstrates how life satisfaction has changed since the second round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II) that was
carried out in 2010. Columns (2.1) and (2.2) reproduce the cross-section results for LiTS II and III, respectively, while column (2.3)
reports the results for the pooled cross-section of LiTS II & III. Comparator countries include France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom for LiTS II; Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Turkey for LiTS III. Columns (2.4)–(2.6) reproduce the same
regressions but consider a panel of primary sampling units (PSUs) which have observations both for 2010 and for 2016. This auto-
matically creates a panel of countries, consisting of 29 post-communist countries and three comparator countries (Germany, Italy, and
Turkey). Finally, column (2.7) reports the results for the same regression as in (2.6), additionally controlling for PSU ﬁxed eﬀects.8
The results conﬁrm that by 2016 the transition happiness gap had closed. Notably, columns (2.4)–(2.6) are very similar to
columns (2.1)–(2.3), although the former consider a panel of PSUs. Columns (2.4) and (2.5) show that, although in 2010 the residents
of post-communist countries were 23 percentage points less likely to be satisﬁed with life than the residents of Germany, Italy, and
Turkey, by 2016 this diﬀerence had disappeared.9 In turn, columns (2.6) and (2.7) suggest that the convergence was achieved due to
Table 1
The transition happiness gap, LiTS.
Life Satisfaction
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5)
Post-communist −0.051 0.007 −0.032 0.071 0.021
(0.123) (0.111) (0.105) (0.070) (0.066)
Log Household Income per Capita 0.103*** 0.108***
(0.028) (0.028)
Can Aﬀord Holidays and Meat 0.188*** 0.191***
(0.014) (0.013)
Can Aﬀord Unexpected Expenses 0.130*** 0.126***
(0.010) (0.010)
Female 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age/10 −0.099*** −0.119*** −0.102*** −0.112*** −0.097***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018)
Age2/100 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Primary Education 0.118*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.084*** 0.082***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Secondary Education 0.207*** 0.181*** 0.152*** 0.155*** 0.127***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Tertiary Education 0.298*** 0.248*** 0.192*** 0.219*** 0.167***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028)
Unemployed −0.190*** −0.135*** −0.124*** −0.124*** −0.116***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014)
Number of Children 0.019** 0.042*** 0.026*** 0.046*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Married 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.018* 0.043*** 0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012)
Divorced/Separated −0.071*** −0.065*** −0.068*** −0.072*** −0.069***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Widow[er] −0.047*** −0.044*** −0.040*** −0.058*** −0.047***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
Urban −0.036*** −0.053*** −0.048*** −0.060*** −0.055***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Log GDP per Capita 0.026 −0.033 −0.014 −0.038 −0.015
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.045) (0.042)
Observations 44448 35079 44448 38664 48857
Source: LiTS III, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations.
Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. * p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Income is self-reported in local currency and then converted to US dollars. In all regressions we additionally control for religion; the coeﬃcients at
these variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Number of children is the number of children under 18 currently living in the house. Speciﬁcations (1.1)-
(1.3) include 29 post-communist countries, Germany and Italy. Speciﬁcations (1.4)-(1.5) also include Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
8 The small number of observations for LiTS II is explained by the fact that in 2010 the respondents were not asked a direct question about the
income of their household. Instead, income is calculated as the sum of reported savings and expenses on several categories of goods and services. To
make the data comparable across observations, income is coded as missing if the answer to at least one of those questions is not present.
9 Notice that the 23 percentage points gap observed in 2010 was indeed very large. As the coeﬃcient for the logarithm of household income per
capita is 0.10–0.11, in order to catch-up with their peers in the non-transition countries, the residents of post-communist countries would have to
increase their logarithm of income by about 2 – i.e. multiply income itself by =exp(2) 7.4. However, given the problems with constructing the
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a substantial decrease in life satisfaction in non-transition countries, while the residents of post-communist countries either ex-
perienced a decrease of a smaller magnitude or did not experience it at all.10
Overall, these results imply that in terms of life satisfaction, there is no longer a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
countries that experienced the transition from plan to market and those that did not.
Fig. 2. Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in transition and comparator countries, LiTS. Source: LiTS, rounds II and III, World Development
Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents that agree or strongly agree with the statement “All things considered, I am satisﬁed
with my life now”. The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms (constant 2011 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Arrows show
the change in average GDP per capita between 2010 and 2015 and in the percentage of respondents satisﬁed with their life between 2010 and 2016.
The dotted lines represent the linear relationship for former communist countries (excluding three outliers: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan) in 2010 and 2016.
(footnote continued)
income variable in LITS II, this back-of-the-envelope calculation should be treated with caution. The Gallup data below provide a more reliable
estimate for 2010.
10 In column (2.7), the PSU dummies automatically absorb country-level variables, including the post-communist dummy. The results are similar
to the ones in (2.6): life satisfaction in non-post-communist countries declined by 33.9 percentage points between 2010 and 2016, while in post-
communist countries the decline was 9.6 percentage points smaller.
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3.1.2. Results from the Gallup World Poll
While LiTS includes almost every single post-communist country in each wave (except Turkmenistan), its set of comparators
countries is very small. In particular, when we consider a panel of PSUs, the data is available only for Germany, Italy, and Turkey. In
turn, the data from the Gallup World Poll allows us to conﬁrm our ﬁndings for a wider range of non-transition countries.11 Because
our aim is to compare life satisfaction across countries with similar income levels, we only consider countries with PPP adjusted GDP
per capita no greater than US$ 35,000, a level that has never yet been reached by any post-communist country, although Czech
Republic is close with a GDP per capita of US$ 34,700.12 Given this speciﬁcation, the comparator group includes more than 40
countries, even if we require the data for them to be available during all the years from 2010 to 2016. Without this restriction, the
number of comparator countries increases to more than 60.
Fig. 3 presents the linear and non-linear non-parametric (lowess) relationship between average life satisfaction and GDP per
capita among transition and non-transition countries for 2010 and 2016. While in 2010 the vast majority of post-communist countries
was below the trend line, this was no longer the case in 2016. In fact, half post-communist countries experienced lower life sa-
tisfaction than predicted by their income, while the other half was above the trend line.13
Given the Gallup World Poll is conducted on a yearly basis, we can also track the evolution of the transition happiness gap over
time. In order to do so, we estimate model (1) for each year from 2010 to 2016. The results are reported in Table 3.
The results presented in Table 3 are consistent with those from the Life in Transition Survey: we ﬁnd that in 2010 residents of
post-communist countries still remained less satisﬁed with life than the residents of comparator countries, but by 2016 this diﬀerence
had disappeared. The closing of the transition happiness gap is estimated to have taken place in 2012–2013, depending on the exact
speciﬁcation of the econometric model. In the standard speciﬁcation, we consider all the countries for which the data are available in
a given year, regardless of whether the data are available in other years. These results are presented in columns (3.1)–(3.7). We also
run the same regressions for the subset of countries with data available for all years from 2010 to 2016 (the respective results are
presented in columns (3.8)–(3.14)). The results do not change. If anything, the transition happiness gap is estimated to close a year
earlier if such a panel is considered.
Fig. 4 depicts the evolution of the transition happiness gap from 2010 to 2016, using the results from columns (3.1) to (3.7). The
solid line represents the absolute value of the diﬀerence between life satisfaction for post-communist and comparator countries, while
the dashed lines denote the boundaries of the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Notice that the magnitude of the 2010 transition happiness gap in 2010 was quite large. The coeﬃcient of 0.35 for the post-
communist dummy in column (3.1) implies that a household in a post-communist country would need to more than double its per
capita income to catch up with a similar household in a non-transition country: as the coeﬃcient for the logarithm of household
Table 2
The transition happiness gap, LiTS.
Life Satisfaction
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7)
Post-communist −0.211*** 0.070 −0.235*** −0.223*** 0.085 −0.228***
(0.053) (0.069) (0.053) (0.076) (0.089) (0.079)
Year = 2016 −0.368*** −0.351*** −0.339***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.047)
Post-communist × Year = 2016 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.096*
(0.065) (0.070) (0.051)
Source LiTS II LiTS III LiTS II & III LiTS II LiTS III LiTS II & III LiTS II & III
PSU panel No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSU ﬁxed eﬀects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 7908 38664 46572 5264 25055 30319 30319
Source: LiTS II & III, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In all the regressions we control for log household income, employment status, gender, age group, the highest completed level of education, the
number of children, marital status, religion, urban/rural status, and log GDP per capita. The coeﬃcients for these variables are statistically sig-
niﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 1. For LiTS III income is self-reported in local currency and then converted to US dollars. For LiTS II
income is calculated as the sum of reported spending and savings and then converted to US dollars. Number of children is the number of children
under 18 currently living in the house. LiTS II has data only on the age group of the respondents; LiTS III data is adjusted accordingly. Speciﬁcations
(2.1)–(2.3) include 29 post-communist countries and all the comparator countries for each respective dataset. Speciﬁcations (2.4)–(2.6) include a
panel of primary sampling units (PSUs) which were present both in LiTS II and in LiTS III. These cover 29 post-communist countries, Germany, Italy,
and Turkey. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation (2.7) considers the panel of PSUs and adds PSU ﬁxed eﬀects.
11 The exact number depends on the speciﬁcation. However, even in the most restrictive cases, there are 40 non-transition countries with levels of
development comparable to those of the post-communist countries.
12We discuss the comparisons with rich countries in Section 3.3.
13 Fig. 3 includes all the countries with data available for 2010 and/or 2016. In the Appendix, we show that the ﬁgure for the panel of countries
(i.e. the subset of countries surveyed both in 2010 and 2016) is similar.
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income is 0.41, the compensating diﬀerential in the logarithm of income would have to be =0.35/0.41 0.85, implying that household
per capita income itself needs to increase by a multiple of =exp(0.85) 2.34.
3.2. Heterogeneous eﬀects
3.2.1. Transition happiness gap by age cohorts
In this subsection, we explore whether or not the closure of the transition happiness gap was uniform across age groups and birth
cohorts.
In order to address this question we ﬁrst consider model (1) simultaneously for 2010 and 2016, excluding the indicator for
residence in a post-communist country, age and age squared from the regression, and then nonparametrically assess the size of the
residual for transition and comparator countries for each birth year, using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess). Thus, the
diﬀerence between the two curves denotes the transition happiness gap for a given birth year. In turn, as we simultaneously include
observations for 2010 and 2016, the residual curves can also be compared across years, allowing us to assess the change in life
satisfaction for a particular age group both in transition and non-transition countries. The results are presented in Fig. 5 with the solid
and dashed lines corresponding to the residents of post-communist and comparator countries, respectively.14
We ﬁnd that by 2010 the transition happiness gap had already disappeared for the younger cohorts (this is perfectly consistent
with Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). If anything, residents of post-communist countries born after 1990 were slightly more satisﬁed
with their lives than their peers from countries that did not experience the transition. However, the gap was present and very large for
the older generations, following a U-shape with the lowest point at the birth year of 1947 – the cohort that turned 63 in 2010. The
non-transition countries’ age proﬁle of life satisfaction also has a U-shape form with the minimum reached somewhere between 30
and 40 years of age – and a much smaller gap in happiness between young and middle-aged.
The second part of Fig. 5 shows that by 2016 the curve for post-communist countries had shifted to the right and become slightly
ﬂatter, while the curve for non-transition countries had shifted downwards, denoting a general decrease in life satisfaction. As a
result, the birth year with a zero transition happiness gap shifted from 1987 to 1970 and all individuals generally experienced a
convergence in life satisfaction. The noticeable downwards shift of the curve for non-transition countries suggests that the residents of
these countries experienced a decrease in life satisfaction. In turn, the curve for post-communist countries remained practically the
same as in 2010.
The ﬁndings presented in Fig. 5 are conﬁrmed when we estimate the size of the transition happiness gap for various birth year
cohorts. Speciﬁcally, we consider model (2), that, in addition to age and age squared, also includes interaction terms of
   ∈post−communist country birth year{ } · { }c for various birth year groups  . Thus, the results can be directly compared with those
in Table 3. We use six-year birth-year groups to facilitate the comparisons across waves by both birth-year and age. For example, the
Fig. 3. Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in transition and comparator countries, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators
and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered
from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life
for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”. The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms
(constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labeled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid line
represents the linear relationship, while the dashed line represents the nonparametric, locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the ﬁgure
considers a cross-section of countries with income levels similar to post-communist countries.
14 Here and further in this section, we report the results for the panel of countries with data from 2010 to 2016.
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cohort born in 1985–90 had the same age in 2010 as the next cohort – born in 1991–96 –when surveyed in 2016. Table 4 presents our
ﬁndings.15
By 2010 the transition happiness gap had fully closed only for individuals born in 1979 or later. All the other residents of post-
communist countries remained signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with life than their non-transition peers, with the gap reaching its maximum
for the birth year around 1950. In turn, by 2016 a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in life satisfaction had persisted only for individuals born
around 1950, although the gap had only narrowly closed for adjacent age groups. Therefore, the happiness convergence took place
across nearly all age groups, although for the old this result is both less prominent and less robust. This result is not surprising
because, as suggested by Fig. 5, the closure of the happiness gap was mainly driven by the residents of comparator countries
Fig. 4. The evolution of the transition happiness gap, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The solid line shows the absolute value of the diﬀerence between life satisfaction in transition and non-transition countries. The dashed
lines represent the boundaries of the 95% conﬁdence interval. The ﬁgure represents the estimates of columns (3.1)–(3.7).
Fig. 5. The transition happiness gap by birth year, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: We consider the panel of countries with data for 2010–2016 (23 post-communist and 40 comparator countries). The solid line represents
the average value of the residual of life satisfaction for post-communist countries, the dashed line – for comparator countries. The birth year speciﬁc
transition happiness gap is the diﬀerence between the two lines.
15We only report the results related to residence in a post-communist country. The coeﬃcients and standard errors for the other variables are
very similar to those reported in Table 3.
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becoming less satisﬁed with life, regardless of age group.
The speciﬁcations used in Table 4 and Fig. 5 are slightly diﬀerent. Table 4 presents the results of separate cross-sectional esti-
mations for 2010 and 2016, while Fig. 5 is based on a pooled regression for both years. Nonetheless, Table 4 conﬁrms the ﬁndings of
Fig. 5, suggesting that the transition happiness gap had closed for most age groups.
3.2.2. Transition happiness gap by education categories
We now consider the role of education in closing the transition happiness gap. As in the case of age, our main question is whether
or not the change in the happiness gap was uniform across education levels. To address this question we begin with considering
model (3) that additionally includes an interaction term of  post−communist country tertiary education{ } · { }c ic. Table 5 presents the
results for the years 2010–2016.
If the transition happiness gap were systematically larger or smaller for the better educated, the coeﬃcient for the interaction
term would have been signiﬁcant. However, as shown in Table 5, this is not the case: the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant for
all the years. Thus, on average the return to education in post-communist and comparator countries was the same during all the years,
and the convergence in life satisfaction was uniform across education levels.
Nonetheless, the average eﬀect hides the heterogeneity in terms of the impact of education across age groups. In order to analyze
this heterogeneity, we compare the residual of life satisfaction across birth year cohorts for individuals with and without tertiary
education. As in Fig. 5, we exclude the dummy for residence in a post-communist country and all the age variables and estimate
model (1), simultaneously for 2010 and 2016; then nonparametrically assess the size of the residual for transition and non-transition
countries for each birth year. In order to understand the role of education, we separately consider the average residuals for two
subsets: individuals with and without tertiary education. Our estimates are displayed in Fig. 6. We should emphasize that to make
Figs. 5 and 6 comparable, we consider the residuals after controlling for the same set of correlates of life satisfaction – including
tertiary education itself. Therefore the residuals do not include the average direct impact of education on life satisfaction (as esti-
mated for the whole sample). Because of the small number of individuals with tertiary education who were born before 1940, we
exclude earlier birth years from the analysis.
The results are as follows. First and foremost, in all graphs, the residuals for individuals with and without tertiary education are
Table 4
The transition happiness gap by birth year group, GWP.
Year of Birth
> 1996 1991–1996 1985–1990 1979–1984 1973-1978 1967–1972 1961–1966 1955–1960 1949–1954 <1949
THG (2010) – 0.347* −0.134 −0.250 −0.287* −0.331** −0.395** −0.541*** −0.638*** −0.598***
(0.185) (0.157) (0.157) (0.161) (0.163) (0.167) (0.172) (0.182) (0.192)
THG (2016) 0.317 −0.038 −0.057 −0.078 −0.108 −0.148 −0.291 −0.314 −0.578*** −0.452
(0.203) (0.161) (0.151) (0.167) (0.155) (0.157) (0.182) (0.194) (0.195) (0.279)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war. The coeﬃcients for
these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$
35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
Table 5
Education and the transition happiness gap, GWP.
Life Satisfaction
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Post-communist −0.304* −0.266 −0.063 0.046 −0.055 −0.119 −0.153
(0.162) (0.170) (0.201) (0.205) (0.169) (0.151) (0.158)
Tertiary Education 0.719*** 0.569*** 0.708*** 0.826*** 0.796*** 0.754*** 0.655***
(0.084) (0.087) (0.066) (0.099) (0.108) (0.086) (0.092)
Post-communist × Tertiary Education −0.058 −0.006 0.057 −0.069 −0.061 −0.057 0.039
(0.091) (0.099) (0.086) (0.118) (0.101) (0.100) (0.093)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, age, age squared, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war.
The coeﬃcients for these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no
higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
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very similar – suggesting that the eﬀect of education on happiness is virtually uniform for all cohorts in transition and non-transition
countries. The exceptions are the very young and very old cohorts. However, as the last pair of graphs shows, these cohorts are not
very representative: there are very few college-educated individuals among the very young, and there are disproportionally many
individuals with tertiary education among the very old. The latter observation may be driven by a positive correlation between
education and life expectancy.
In 2010 the curves for the residual of life satisfaction almost perfectly coincided for individuals born from 1955 to 1980, re-
gardless of whether they lived in transition or non-transition countries. This suggests that across these birth year cohorts the eﬀect of
education on life satisfaction is homogeneous and accurately estimated by model (1) for both types of countries. In turn, the return to
education was considerably lower for the young (born after 1980) in post-communist countries, while the opposite was true in
comparator countries. Similarly, educated individuals, born before 1955, experienced lower levels of life satisfaction when living in
transition countries and higher levels of life satisfaction when living in non-transition countries, although in the latter case the gap
was less prominent.
By 2016 the following changes had taken place. For post-communist countries, the eﬀect of a university degree had become more
homogeneous across birth year cohorts, with the gap for the young and the old becoming considerably narrower. Only the young still
experienced a slightly lower return to education. In comparator countries, the eﬀect of a university degree also generally became
more homogeneous for individuals born after 1960. In particular, the return to education decreased for the young, while it remained
the same for the middle-aged. However, the eﬀect of a university degree substantially increased for the generations born before 1960.
We further compare the residual curves across time. In post-communist countries, the curve for educated individuals had shifted
upwards, denoting an increase in life satisfaction, while the curve for the uneducated remained the same for the middle-aged and
shifted downwards for the young and the old. At the same time, in comparator countries both curves shifted downwards for all age
groups except for the older cohorts with tertiary education. In terms of the transition happiness gap, these results imply that – apart
from the general convergence by birth year cohorts discussed in the previous section – by 2016 the gap had narrowed substantially
for young individuals with tertiary education. This convergence was driven both by an increase in the return to education in post-
communist countries and a respective decrease for comparator countries. Furthermore, the results imply that the transition happiness
gap generally narrowed for the educated individuals, except those born before 1960. In turn, uneducated individuals experienced
little convergence in life satisfaction (with the possible exception of the middle-aged).
Our conclusions are conﬁrmed when we reproduce the same regressions as in Table 4 separately for individuals with and without
tertiary education. Table 6 presents the results.
Most notably, although the transition happiness gap had already closed by 2010 for the younger generations when all education
levels were considered, it remained present for individuals with tertiary education. Moreover, the gap was very large in magnitude,
corresponding to nearly 1.3 steps on the 10-step happiness ladder for individuals born after 1990. By 2016 this gap had closed, and
the educated young in post-communist countries are no longer less satisﬁed with life than their peers in comparator countries.
In other respects, Table 6 also conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Fig. 6. In particular, although all educated individuals born after 1954
experienced convergence in life satisfaction, the transition happiness gap persisted for the older cohorts with higher education. In
turn, the gap only slightly narrowed for the uneducated, although it should be noted that in 2010 it had already been considerably
smaller than for individuals with tertiary education.
Overall, we conclude that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by educated individuals, especially the young.
As discussed in Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), this may be explained by the fact that the younger cohorts received their education
after the transition from plan to market; this education was probably more suitable for the needs of the market economy.
3.2.3. Transition happiness gap by gender
In this subsection, we explore the evolution of the transition happiness gap by gender. Following an approach, similar to the one
for education, we begin with excluding the dummy for residence in a post-communist country and replacing it with two interaction
terms:  post−communist country female{ } · { }c ic and  post−communist country male{ } · { }c ic. Thus, we are able to separately estimate the
transition happiness gap for the male and female population. The results are presented in Table 7.
We ﬁnd that the female population of post-communist countries used to be signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with life than their
counterparts in comparator countries. In particular, by 2010 the transition happiness gap had already closed for the male part of the
population. In turn, for women the gap persisted, allowing us to conclude that the overall transition happiness gap was primarily
determined by females.
By 2016 both men and women had experienced further convergence in life satisfaction. In particular, the transition happiness gap
for women had closed, thus, driving its closure for the entire population as well.
Notably, the sum of coeﬃcients for being female and being female in a transition country is always almost perfectly equal to the
coeﬃcient for being male in a transition country. Thus, while in comparator countries women were on average happier than men, in
post-communist countries the respective levels of life satisfaction were practically identical. This relationship is present for all the
years in our sample with the possible exception of 2014 and 2015, suggesting that the convergence in life satisfaction was uniform
across gender.
We next estimate the size of the transition happiness gap by birth year cohorts separately for the male and female population. The
results are presented in Table 8.
Conﬁrming the results of Table 7, in 2010 the transition happiness gap was large and signiﬁcant for all female cohorts except the
very young, while for men it was present only for the old and was considerably smaller. In particular, only men born before 1961
experienced signiﬁcantly lower levels of life satisfaction in post-communist countries than in comparator countries. For women, the
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Fig. 6. Residual of life satisfaction by birth year and education level, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: In the ﬁrst three pairs of graphs the solid line represents the average value of the residual of life satisfaction for individuals with tertiary
education, the dashed line – without tertiary education. In the last pair of graphs the solid line represents the sample share of the population with
tertiary education in post-communist countries, the dashed line – in comparator countries. In each pair, the left graph shows the results for 2010 and
the right one shows the results for 2016.
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gap was present for all cohorts born before 1985.
By 2016 practically all individuals experienced some convergence in life satisfaction, regardless of gender. Moreover, this con-
vergence was virtually uniform for the young and middle-aged individuals of both sexes. However, the transition happiness gap had
decreased substantially for the old male population (born before 1955), whereas for old women it remained the same as in 2010.
We also note that while in 2010–2016 females living in comparator countries were signiﬁcantly happier than men, in post-
communist countries life satisfaction remained approximately the same across the genders.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that in 2010 the overall transition happiness gap mainly persisted due to its presence for women; for men,
the gap had already closed. By 2016 nearly all parts of the society had experienced convergence in life satisfaction, regardless of age
and gender, and the transition happiness gap became no longer statistically signiﬁcant for women. The only part of the population
that did not experience convergence in life satisfaction were women born before 1955. For these women, the transition happiness gap
remained very large even in 2016. Given that in transition countries women signiﬁcantly outlive men (and the gap between female
and male life expectancy is larger than in comparator countries), this fact has major political implications: older women dissatisﬁed
with their lives are more likely to reject reforms that may bring prosperity in the long run. Policymakers should investigate the
sources of low life satisfaction of older women and carry out the policies that can correct these remaining disproportionately large
happiness gaps.
3.2.4. Transition happiness gap by income level
We further examine whether the closure of the transition happiness gap was homogeneous across income levels. In order to
Table 6
The transition happiness gap by birth year group and education level, GWP.
With Tertiary Education
Year of Birth >1996 1991–1996 1985–1990 1979–1984 1973-1978 1967–1972 1961–1966 1955–1960 1949–1954 <1949
THG (2010) – −1.314*** −0.270* −0.282* −0.340** −0.221 −0.377** −0.644*** −0.502** −1.120***
(0.363) (0.151) (0.162) (0.154) (0.181) (0.168) (0.178) (0.196) (0.245)
THG (2016) −0.659 −0.222 −0.124 −0.027 −0.083 −0.015 −0.169 −0.321 −0.658** −0.862**
(0.664) (0.233) (0.170) (0.189) (0.199) (0.181) (0.206) (0.232) (0.270) (0.378)
Without Tertiary Education
Year of Birth > 1996 1991–1996 1985–1990 1979–1984 1973-1978 1967–1972 1961–1966 1955–1960 1949–1954 <1949
THG (2010) – 0.381** −0.020 −0.164 −0.171 −0.249 −0.262 −0.361* −0.531*** −0.352*
(0.187) (0.169) (0.172) (0.175) (0.173) (0.187) (0.187) (0.195) (0.206)
THG (2016) 0.314 0.064 0.035 −0.034 −0.036 −0.105 −0.237 −0.216 −0.490** −0.292
(0.204) (0.159) (0.156) (0.174) (0.153) (0.165) (0.192) (0.202) (0.199) (0.297)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war. The coeﬃcients for
these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$
35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
Table 7
Gender and the transition happiness gap, GWP.
Life Satisfaction
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Post-communist × Male −0.244 −0.125 0.041 0.135 −0.033 −0.048 −0.075
(0.162) (0.175) (0.201) (0.205) (0.164) (0.153) (0.152)
Post-communist × Female −0.375** −0.426** −0.176 −0.056 −0.079 −0.197 −0.242
(0.168) (0.171) (0.204) (0.209) (0.181) (0.160) (0.170)
Female 0.152*** 0.307*** 0.231*** 0.239*** 0.195*** 0.254*** 0.197***
(0.049) (0.066) (0.047) (0.057) (0.052) (0.047) (0.058)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, age, age squared, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war.
The coeﬃcients for these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no
higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
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understand whether the happiness convergence has been driven by richer or poorer households, we again compare the residuals of
life satisfaction across income levels for post-communist and comparator countries. In particular, after excluding log household
income per capita and the dummy for residence in a transition country, we estimate model (1) simultaneously for 2010 and 2016 and
then plot the non-parametric relationship between the residual and log household income per capita for post-communist and
comparator countries. Our ﬁndings are presented in Fig. 7.16 Similarly to Fig. 5 above, the vertical distance between the curves in
Fig. 7 represents the transition happiness gap for a given income level.
In 2010 the transition happiness gap for the poorest individuals (income per capita ≤ $1,100 or logarithm of income per capita
≤ 7) was quite small, corresponding to 0.2–0.25 points on the ten-step happiness ladder. For the middle part of the income dis-
tribution in the transition region (household income per capita between $1,100 and $8,100 or log household income per capita
between 7 and 9), constituting almost 68% of the population in post-communist countries, the gap was much wider, about half a step
on the happiness ladder. However, for the richest individuals the gap was again narrow, fully closing for those with income per capita
of $20,000 and higher (logarithm of income per capita ≥ 10).
By 2016 post-communist countries had experienced an increase in the life satisfaction of the middle-income individuals, while for
the poor and the rich the average residual did not change. In turn, comparator countries experienced a decline in life satisfaction for
all income levels except for the very rich, resulting in the closure of the transition happiness gap for all income levels. In particular,
middle-income individuals in post-communist countries almost fully converged in terms of life satisfaction with their non-transition
peers.
It is also important to emphasize that by 2016 the post-communist countries had arrived at a linear relationship between the
logarithm of per capita income and life satisfaction, characteristic for non-transition countries and the world as a whole (Stevenson
and Wolfers, 2008). While as recently as in 2010 this relationship exhibited “increasing marginal happiness returns to income” in
transition countries, now the relationship between the logarithm of income and life satisfaction is linear, and its slope is the same as
in the rest of the world.
To conﬁrm the ﬁndings shown in Fig. 7, we carry out an econometric estimation of the size of the transition happiness gap for
various income levels. Similarly to the case of age and education, we consider model (5) that excludes the dummy for residence in a
post-communist country but instead includes the interaction terms of    ∈post−communist country income{ } · { }c for various income
groups  . Table 9 presents the results.
As suggested by Fig. 7, in 2010 the transition happiness gap was largest for individuals with log household income per capita
between 7.5 and 9. For all other income levels, the gap had already closed. In turn, by 2016 the levels of life satisfaction in post-
communist and comparator countries had further converged. Most notably, the transition happiness gap had disappeared for middle-
income individuals.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the transition happiness gap had previously been primarily determined by middle-income individuals,
constituting a signiﬁcant part of the population. By 2016 the gap had closed for these income levels, contributing to the general
Table 8
The transition happiness gap by birth year group and gender, GWP.
Female
Year of Birth > 1996 1991–1996 1985–1990 1979–1984 1973-1978 1967–1972 1961–1966 1955–1960 1949–1954 <1949
THG (2010) – 0.352 −0.221 −0.331* −0.348** −0.409** −0.570*** −0.742*** −0.777*** −0.829***
(0.218) (0.165) (0.181) (0.173) (0.166) (0.173) (0.187) (0.189) (0.215)
THG (2016) 0.245 −0.083 −0.175 −0.221 −0.214 −0.229 −0.414** −0.526** −0.745*** −0.861**
(0.243) (0.165) (0.153) (0.189) (0.170) (0.183) (0.196) (0.216) (0.257) (0.330)
Male
Year of Birth >1996 1991–1996 1985–1990 1979–1984 1973-1978 1967–1972 1961–1966 1955–1960 1949–1954 <1949
THG (2010) – 0.339* −0.056 −0.182 −0.250 −0.295 −0.249 −0.371** −0.558*** −0.415**
(0.201) (0.167) (0.156) (0.165) (0.178) (0.181) (0.177) (0.204) (0.207)
THG (2016) 0.389 0.003 0.060 0.083 0.013 −0.069 −0.177 −0.109 −0.450** −0.100
(0.242) (0.176) (0.163) (0.161) (0.155) (0.151) (0.179) (0.189) (0.187) (0.282)
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war. The coeﬃcients for
these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$
35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
16 Because of the small number of individuals in post-communist countries with log household income per capita below 5 or above 10.5 (income
per capita below $148 or above $36,300), we exclude these observations from the analysis. Together these observations constitute less than 1% of
the sample population of post-communist countries.
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convergence in life satisfaction in post-communist and comparator countries.
3.3. Robustness checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks: breaking down the results by country groups, re-estimating LiTS results with
a ﬁve-point (rather than binary) scale for the degree of life satisfaction, adding rich countries as comparators, and estimating a two-
Fig. 7. The transition happiness gap by income level, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: We consider the panel of countries with data for 2010–2016 (23 post-communist and 40 comparator countries). The solid line represents
the average value of the residual of life satisfaction for post-communist countries, the dashed line – for comparator countries. The income speciﬁc
transition happiness gap is the diﬀerence between the two lines.
Table 9
The transition happiness gap by income level, GWP.
Log Household Income per Capita
<6 6–6.5 6.5–7 7–7.5 7.5–8 8–8.5 8.5–9 9–9.5 9.5–10 >10
THG (2010) −0.156 −0.204 −0.188 −0.279 −0.348** −0.476*** −0.374* −0.277 −0.199 −0.267
(0.161) (0.210) (0.195) (0.185) (0.162) (0.172) (0.191) (0.191) (0.228) (0.251)
THG (2016) 0.337 −0.131 −0.255 −0.064 −0.151 −0.161 −0.183 −0.169 −0.156 −0.104
(0.437) (0.295) (0.254) (0.220) (0.208) (0.183) (0.165) (0.154) (0.164) (0.196)
Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for log household income per capita, employment status, education level, log GDP per capita, urban/
rural status, gender, the number of children, marital status, religion, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict or war. The coeﬃcients for
these variables are signiﬁcant and similar to those reported in Table 3. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$
35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
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stage procedure (ﬁrst estimating the returns to individual characteristics and then running the country-level regressions for residuals
on country-level variables).
3.3.1. Heterogeneity among countries
We have checked whether the closure of the transition happiness gap was uniform across various groups of post-communist
countries. In particular, we use EBRD’s classiﬁcation of countries into Central Asia, Central Europe and the Baltics, South-Eastern
Europe, and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (the results are available upon request). The “happiness convergence” turns out to be
strikingly uniform across all the groups of countries with the exception of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. However, the latter result
is driven solely by Ukraine: in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus excluding Ukraine, the transition happiness gap has also closed. In
Ukraine, however, the happiness gap has actually grown signiﬁcantly since 2010. As shown in Fig. 3, Ukraine had zero happiness gap
in 2010 but a gap of a full one point (on a ten-point scale) in 2016. This substantial decrease in life satisfaction in Ukraine is likely to
have been caused by the instability associated with the political turbulence of the last months of Yanukovych’s government, the
annexation of Crimea, and the war in Eastern Ukraine.
3.3.2. Five-point scale in the Life in Transition Survey
We re-estimate the regressions of Table 1, using a ﬁve-point scale for the degree of life satisfaction. The results are presented in
Table 10 and are very similar those reported in Table 1 in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical signiﬁcance. In all regressions,
there is no statistically signiﬁcant transition happiness gap.
3.3.3. Adding rich countries as comparators
In the Gallup World Poll regressions above we excluded rich comparator countries (i.e. all countries with GDP per capita above
$35,000). In this section, we all the available countries as comparators. Columns (11.1)–(11.7) of Table 11 reproduce the results of
Table 3, using the panel for this new set of comparators.
When rich comparator countries are included in the regression, in some speciﬁcations we ﬁnd no transition happiness gap in
2012–14, but a marginally signiﬁcant transition happiness gap in 2015–16. This diﬀerence in results is fully explained by the fact that
residents of rich countries are considerably more satisﬁed with life than their peers in poorer countries, even controlling for log
household income per capita and GDP per capita. Notably, although GDP per capita was never signiﬁcant in columns (3.8)–(3.14), it
became highly signiﬁcant in columns (11.1)–(11.7), suggesting that the new set of comparator countries requires additional control
variables to explain the diﬀerences in life satisfaction. The return to income is also estimated to be considerably higher in columns
(11.1)–(11.7) than in Table 3, suggesting that the relationship between income and life satisfaction in rich countries is diﬀerent from
the respective relationship for poorer countries.
Fig. 8 provides further evidence in support of this conclusion. Similarly to Fig. 3, it plots the relationship between average life
satisfaction and the level of GDP per capita, now additionally including rich non-transition countries. A separate linear trend is added
for countries with GDP per capita above and below $35,000, as well as a non-parametric (lowess) estimate of the respective re-
lationship.
We ﬁnd a discontinuous increase in life satisfaction after a country reaches the level of GDP per capita of $35,000 (which
corresponds to a steep increase in the case of non-parametric estimation). This suggests that the residents of rich countries are
considerably happier than predicted by their income; therefore, it is problematic to use them as comparators when estimating the
transition happiness gap.
Regression analysis also shows that life satisfaction in rich countries is considerably higher than in other non-transition countries.
We estimate the following model. Using all the same variables as in model (1), we additionally include a dummy for residence in a
country that had GDP per capita larger than $35,000 in 2010–2016. Thus, the coeﬃcient for the latter represents the diﬀerence in life
satisfaction between non-transition countries with high and low income levels. To make interpretation easier, we exclude countries
that had GDP per capita both above and below the respective cutoﬀ level during the considered time period. The results are presented
in columns (11.8)–(11.14) of Table 11.
We ﬁnd that residents of rich countries are signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with life than their peers in other non-transition countries.
Moreover, the respective coeﬃcient is quite large, representing approximately half a step on the ten-step happiness ladder. This is
nearly twice as large as the size of the transition happiness gap at its peak in 2010. Therefore, we conclude that the reappearance of a
small transition happiness gap, reported in columns (11.1)–(11.7), was primarily driven by the particularly high levels of life sa-
tisfaction in rich countries rather than by the low levels of happiness in post-communist countries.
3.3.4. Two-stage estimation
The speciﬁcation of model (1) assumes that the value of the intercept for all non-transition countries is the same conditional on
the logarithm of GDP per capita and involvement in a military conﬂict. In turn, the size of the transition happiness gap is assumed to
be the same in all the post-communist countries. These assumptions are consistent with the existing literature and are partially
justiﬁed by the fact that the relationship between the average level of life satisfaction and the logarithm of the country’s GDP per
capita is linear, as shown in Fig. 3. Nevertheless, it is possible that the coeﬃcients for the individual-level and household-level
characteristics were aﬀected by the imposed uniformity of country-speciﬁc intercepts among post-communist countries and among
comparators.
Using data from the Gallup World Poll, we show that our results do not change if we consider a more general setting where the
level of the intercept is initially allowed to vary arbitrarily from country to country. In particular, we consider the following two-stage
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procedure. First, we run model (1) adding a dummy for each country in our sample. Thus, we estimate the eﬀect of individual-level
and household-level characteristics, while allowing for an arbitrary impact of country-level variables such as the transition happiness
gap.17 We then subtract the eﬀect of individual-level and household-level characteristics, creating a measure of life satisfaction that
only depends on variables that are determined at a country level. After that we construct the weighted average of residual life
satisfaction for each of the countries, using population weights, and consider the second-stage regression of the following form.
  = + ′ +residual life satisfaction ρ post−communist country· { } Γ ɛ .c c (6)
At this stage, we no longer need to control for individual-level characteristics, so  contains only country-level variables such as
the logarithm of GDP per capita and involvement in a military conﬂict or war. The diﬀerence between ρ in model (6) and β in model
(1) comes from the fact that because of the inclusion of country dummies at the ﬁrst stage, the estimates of the coeﬃcients for
individual-level and household-level characteristics may change.
Table 12 presents the estimates of the transition happiness gap, calculated via our two-stage procedure, for the panel of countries
with data from 2010 to 2016.18 In general, all the coeﬃcients (including those at the individual and household-level characteristics)
are very similar to those reported in Table 3. The happiness gap itself is estimated to be slightly larger than for model (1) for all the
Table 10
The transition happiness gap, LiTS.
Life satisfaction
(10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5)
Post-communist −0.154 −0.040 −0.109 0.157 0.043
(0.258) (0.246) (0.212) (0.163) (0.149)
Log Household Income per Capita 0.286*** 0.297***
(0.075) (0.074)
Can Aﬀord Holidays and Meat 0.436*** 0.448***
(0.030) (0.028)
Can Aﬀord Unexpected Expenses 0.360*** 0.353***
(0.027) (0.025)
Female 0.025* 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Age/10 −0.243*** −0.289*** −0.250*** −0.268*** −0.239***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.035) (0.052) (0.044)
Age2/100 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Primary Education 0.326*** 0.296*** 0.292*** 0.226*** 0.224***
(0.081) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072)
Secondary Education 0.544*** 0.473*** 0.406*** 0.394*** 0.331***
(0.087) (0.080) (0.077) (0.084) (0.078)
Tertiary Education 0.748*** 0.609*** 0.482*** 0.527*** 0.407***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.074) (0.095) (0.077)
Unemployed −0.540*** −0.412*** −0.374*** −0.392*** −0.365***
(0.045) (0.052) (0.036) (0.054) (0.036)
Number of Children 0.034* 0.099*** 0.052*** 0.108*** 0.054***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017)
Married 0.103*** 0.136*** 0.050* 0.109** 0.037
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.032)
Divorced/Separated −0.163*** −0.152*** −0.154*** −0.178*** −0.162***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.036) (0.027)
Widow[er] −0.111*** −0.113*** −0.093*** −0.152*** −0.112***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.033)
Urban −0.079** −0.126*** −0.108*** −0.144*** −0.123***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.024) (0.040) (0.029)
Log GDP per Capita 0.073 −0.090 −0.027 −0.103 −0.031
(0.108) (0.102) (0.099) (0.107) (0.102)
Observations 44448 35079 44448 38664 48857
Source: LiTS III, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 10 reproduces the results of Table 1, using a 5-point scale of life satisfaction instead of the binary measure. The income is self-reported in local
currency and then converted to US dollars. In all regressions we additionally control for religion; the coeﬃcients at these variables are statistically
signiﬁcant. Number of children is the number of children under 18 currently living in the house. Speciﬁcations (10.1)-(10.3) include 29 post-
communist countries, Germany and Italy. Speciﬁcations (10.4)-(10.5) also include Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
17 Note that the country dummies absorb all the country-level characteristics that we previously included in the model (i.e., log GDP per capita,
involvement in a military conﬂict, etc.).
18 Here we again use only countries with GDP per capita no greater than $35,000 as comparators.
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years, but it still stops being signiﬁcant in 2012 which is consistent with our previous ﬁndings. Overall, the two-stage model yields
results that are very similar to those of model (1).
4. Concluding remarks
For more than 20 years after the transition from plan to market, the residents of former communist countries consistently reported
lower life satisfaction than the residents of other countries with similar levels of income – a phenomenon that became known as the
transition happiness gap. However, using newly available data from the Life in Transition Survey and the Gallup World Poll, we ﬁnd
that the transition happiness gap has ﬁnally closed. The closing is estimated to have taken place in 2012–2013.
Our analysis suggests that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily determined by the younger and middle-age cohorts,
especially those who were better educated and had middle levels of income. As of 2016, individuals that were younger than 45 no
longer had lower life satisfaction when living in post-communist countries rather than other countries with similar levels of income.
This ﬁnding does not depend on the respondent’s gender, income or highest level of completed education. In turn, the older gen-
erations, living in post-communist countries, are still signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with life than their peers in comparator countries,
although for most individuals the diﬀerence has become substantially smaller as well.
Nevertheless, there is considerable heterogeneity in the size of the remaining transition happiness gap for the older cohorts,
depending on gender and education. In particular, women born before 1955 did not experience any convergence in life satisfaction in
2010–2016, while for men of a similar age the gap did become slightly smaller. We ﬁnd no such pattern for the younger and middle-
aged cohorts, although we do ﬁnd that in transition countries women and men have had very similar levels of life satisfaction, while
in comparator countries women have consistently been happier than men, resulting in a wider transition happiness gap for the female
population. However, for individuals born after 1954, the convergence in life satisfaction was homogenous across gender.
The happiness gap also remains quite large for the older cohorts with tertiary education, while for individuals without a university
degree it is substantially smaller. This ﬁnding is determined by an increase in the return to education for the old in comparator
countries. Conversely, individuals with tertiary education born after 1990 experienced convergence in life satisfaction. These in-
dividuals received their education after the transition, so this result is consistent with a “human capital depreciation” argument that
conjectures that recent graduates receive skills that are more suitable for the needs of the market economy.
Taken together these results imply that transition happiness gap has closed on average but not for all parts of the society. Policy
makers in transition countries need to pay special attention to the well-being of the older cohorts, especially of women. The data we
use in this paper is not suﬃciently granular to explore the sources of their lower life satisfaction (which are also likely to be country-
speciﬁc) but the fact that there remains a very large and persistent transition happiness gap among women born before 1967 – and
especially those born before 1955 – points to a major social (and therefore political) challenge.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the relationship between the logarithm of household per capita income and life satisfaction in post-com-
munist countries has become linear – with the same slope as in non-transition countries. This ﬁnding may be interpreted as yet
another piece of evidence that the “happiness transition” has ﬁnally been completed.
Fig. 8. Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in transition and comparator countries, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators
and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered
from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life
for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”. The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms
(constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labeled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid
lines represent the linear relationships for countries with GDP per capita above and below $35,000; the dashed line represents the nonparametric,
locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the ﬁgure considers a cross-section of countries with income levels similar to post-communist
countries or higher.
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Appendix
Appendix A. GWP Countries
Post-communist Comparator, GDP per capita ≤ $35, 000 Comparator, all other
2010 Albania Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden,
United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States.
2011 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan,
Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, United
Table 12
The two-stage estimation of the transition happiness gap, GWP.
(12.1) (12.2) (12.3) (12.4) (12.5) (12.6) (12.7)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Second Stage: Residual of Life Satisfaction
Post-communist −0.433** −0.451** −0.204 −0.111 −0.175 −0.232 −0.279
(0.186) (0.194) (0.195) (0.220) (0.181) (0.170) (0.176)
Log GDP per Capita 0.222** 0.085 0.178** 0.234** 0.185** 0.216** 0.273***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.085) (0.100) (0.091) (0.086) (0.094)
First Stage: Life Satisfaction
Log Household Income per Capita 0.472*** 0.469*** 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.393***
(0.036) (0.029) (0.045) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027)
Unemployed −0.448*** −0.428*** −0.395*** −0.433*** −0.413*** −0.485*** −0.510***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
Secondary Education 0.407*** 0.315*** 0.409*** 0.418*** 0.348*** 0.359*** 0.354***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) (0.038)
Tertiary Education 0.736*** 0.704*** 0.797*** 0.864*** 0.792*** 0.810*** 0.823***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.053)
Female 0.086*** 0.134*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.145*** 0.172*** 0.121***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033)
Age/10 −0.365*** −0.452*** −0.372*** −0.374*** −0.568*** −0.562*** −0.543***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.079) (0.073) (0.081) (0.086) (0.089)
Age2/100 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.047***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Small Town 0.091 0.046 −0.022 0.107* 0.011 0.103** 0.019
(0.077) (0.051) (0.072) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.054)
Suburb of Large City 0.153** −0.015 0.239** 0.099 −0.019 0.081 0.065
(0.076) (0.093) (0.096) (0.093) (0.111) (0.074) (0.074)
Large City 0.152*** 0.110 0.121** 0.131** 0.046 0.092* 0.103*
(0.052) (0.067) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053)
Countries 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Post-Communist Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all the regressions we additionally control for religion, the number of children, marital status, and the country’s involvement in a military conﬂict
or war. We consider all countries that have GDP per capita no higher than US$ 35,000 (PPP, 2016) as comparators.
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Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
United States.
2012 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States.
2013 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi
Arabia, Sweden, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States.
2014 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa), Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom, United States.
2015 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile,
Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), CostaRica,
Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan,
Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, South
Korea, SouthSudan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom.
Post-communist Comparator, GDP per capita ≤ $35, 000 Comparator, all other
2016 Albania Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland,
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, BurkinaFaso, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo
(Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
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Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States.
Panel Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,
Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi
Arabia, South Korea, Sweden, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom.
Appendix B. Figures
Fig. 9. Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in the GWP panel of transition and comparator countries. Source: Gallup World Poll, World Development
Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered
from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life
for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”. The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms
(constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labeled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid line
represents the linear relationship between GDP per capita and life satisfaction; the dashed line represents the nonparametric, locally weighted
regressions (lowess). Each part of the ﬁgure considers a panel of countries for which the data is available in 2010–2016 with income levels similar to
post-communist countries.
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Fig. 10. Life satisfaction and GDP per capita in the GWP panel of transition and comparator countries. Source: Gallup World Poll, World
Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The vertical axis shows the average response the residents of a country give to the question “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered
from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life
for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”. The horizontal axis shows the GDP per capita in PPP terms
(constant 2016 international dollars) in logarithmic scale. Post-communist countries are labeled, dots represent comparator countries. The solid
lines represent the linear relationships for countries with GDP per capita above and below $35,000; the dashed line represents the nonparametric,
locally weighted regressions (lowess). Each part of the ﬁgure considers a panel of countries for which the data is available in 2010–2016 with
income levels similar to post-communist countries or higher.
Fig. 11. The share of the population with tertiary education by birth year and gender, GWP. Source: Gallup World Poll and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The solid line represents the share of the female population with tertiary education by birth year; the dashed line – the respective share of
the male population.
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